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Overcoming Toxic Polarization: Lessons
in Effective Bridging
john a. powell†
Abstract
Our world is in the throes of multiple global crises, from the
Covid-19 pandemic to the onset of climate change. These crises have
revealed deep dysfunctions in our societies. Undergirding these
dysfunctions is widening political, economic, and social
polarization. Polarization has intensified to such a degree that it
now constitutes what political scientists refer to as ‘negative
partisanship,’ where policy positions are based on hostility to the
opposition’s view. Polarization extends beyond our politics and
deeply into our culture, where it straddles divides of race, geography,
religion, and gender.
This Article explores the true nature of the problem of toxic
polarization, the harms that flow therefrom, and what we must do
about it. Advocates for unity and experts focused on de-polarization
advance bridging practices as an antidote but have inadequately
theorized how power and context shapes the possibilities for change.
This Article argues that bridging is necessary but that such efforts
must be sensitive to structural contexts. Through unique parallels
drawn from dynamic film adaptations and pivotal literary works,
this Article illustrates the power of context to reduce polarization and
the power of narrative to shape interpretative meaning.
I.

Introduction

As the startling events and crises of 2020 recede from the
foreground, we collectively turn our attention to what may come
next. We have experienced an unprecedented set of simultaneous
challenges and crises that impact the entire world. These challenges
were not the kind one could easily ignore. Nor did we know when or
if they would abate or resolve. And while there is reason and space
†. Director of the Othering & Belonging Institute at UC Berkeley, Robert D.
Haas Chancellor’s Chair in Equity & Inclusion, Professor of Law, African-American,
& Ethnic Studies, at the University of California at Berkeley. The author would like
to thank Eloy Toppin, Stephen Menendian, Kendrick Peterson and Nahlee Lin for
their assistance with this article.
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for optimism, there is still much room for uncertainty and concern.
Will the Covid-19 vaccine work as we have been told? Who will get
the vaccine and in what time frame? Can we reach herd immunity
and protect our most vulnerable? Do we have reason to believe that
we can return to “normal” and if not, what is the new normal? These
are just some of the questions that we carry with us.
But even with the most optimistic of outcomes for the
pandemic and our politics, there remain serious concerns about how
we will move into the future. These concerns include climate
change, advancing technology and artificial intelligence, hate
speech and social media, and the rules of the global health and
economic order, to list just a few. But these issues are not what I
will focus on in this Article. Instead, I will discuss the more
immediate social order. Can we move together as a people, as a
nation, and as a world? Or will the fragmentation and toxic
polarization in our societies consume us, our institutions, and
possibly our country?
While most Americans appear to be concerned with the
polarization that has gripped our country and indeed the world,1
there is no consensus even among those who are most focused on
this problem on how to solve it.2 Maybe unsurprisingly, there is not
even agreement on what the divide is. There are many contenders,
and they are not mutually exclusive. These include the racial divide,
or more accurately the divide between people who are raced as
“white” and many people of color. There is the divide between the
educated, often urban-based population centers and the lesseducated exurban and rural “hinterlands,” often left behind by
globalization and deindustrialization. There is the political divide
between those who generally support(ed) Trump, many of whom

1. See generally Drew DeSilver, The Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots
in the 1970s, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-and-has-beengetting-worse-ever-since/ [https://perma.cc/SN2L-XT47] (describing research that
revealed increasing polarization in Congress began emerging in the 1970s); see also
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Responding to Europe’s Political Polarization, RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE: FRANCE STRATÉGIE (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/
english-articles/responding-europes-political-polarization [https://perma.cc/M7B7BB7C] (describing polarization in Europe).
2. See, e.g., EZRA KLEIN, WHY WE’RE POLARIZED (2020) (a book long on the
problem, but short on solutions). It is also true that when polarization is referenced,
what is often meant is in actuality fragmentation and dehumanization. See NATHAN
P. KALMOE & LILLIANA MASON, RADICAL AMERICAN PARTISANSHIP: MAPPING
VIOLENT HISTORY, ITS CAUSES, AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRACY (2022).
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believe the election was stolen, and those who opposed his
candidacy.3
There are also a growing number of people who believe in the
propriety of white, Christian, male dominance, especially one that
is Protestant and American, both within our country and on the
global stage.4 There are many different variations of this viewpoint,
most of which would have been seen as “fringe” ten or even twenty
years ago. Now it is mainstream and deeply entrenched within the
Republican party, and especially by a substantial number of Trump
supporters.5
What used to be merely a political divide has now become a
deep racial and national divide. Part of the reason for this is
political, racial (and to a lesser extent, gender) polarization. In
2012, for example, 88% of Mitt Romney’s support came from white
voters, yet Romney only won 48.1% of the overall vote.6 As a
corollary, President Obama won huge majorities of the non-white
vote. Obama won 93% of the African-American vote, 71% of the
Latino vote, 73% of the Asian vote, and 38% of the white vote.7 In
2020, preliminary exit polls showed that women supported Biden

3. See JOHN SIDES, MICHAEL TESLER & LYNN VAVRECK, IDENTITY CRISIS: THE
2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA
(2018), for a discussion on racial division. See MARTIN SANDBU, THE ECONOMICS OF
BELONGING: A RADICAL PLAN TO WIN BACK THE LEFT BEHIND AND ACHIEVE
PROSPERITY FOR ALL (2020), for the divide between the educated urban base and the
less-educated rural base. See Jan Zilinsky, Jonathan Nagler & Joshua Tucker,
Which Republicans Are Most Likely to Think the Election Was Stolen? Those Who
Dislike Democrats and Don’t Mind White Nationalists, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/19/which-republicans-thinkelection-was-stolen-those-who-hate-democrats-dont-mind-white-nationalists/
[https://perma.cc/6ZYF-4FU8], for the divide between those for and against Trump.
4. See generally ROBERT P. JONES, THE END OF WHITE CHRISTIAN AMERICA
(2017) (providing a background of the life and “death” of white Christian America).
5. PRRI Staff, Dueling Realities: Amid Multiple Crises, Trump and Biden
Supporters See Different Priorities and Futures for the Nation, PUB. RELIGION RSCH.
INST. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.prri.org/research/amid-multiple-crises-trumpand-biden-supporters-see-different-realities-and-futures-for-the-nation/#pagesection-0 [https://perma.cc/SS44-YFVQ]; see also Gene Demby & Shereen Marisol
Meraji, The White Elephants in the Room, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/17/935910276/the-white-elephants-in-the-room
[https://perma.cc/UHY4-PQKS] (discussing white Evangelical voters’ overwhelming
support for Trump).
6. john a. powell, The New Southern Strategy, UC BERKELEY: BERKELEY BLOG
(Jan. 30, 2013), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2013/01/30/the-new-southern-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/K5TK-UC25] [hereinafter powell, New Southern Strategy].
7. President Exit Polls – Election 2012, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2012/results/president/exit-polls.html [https://perma.cc/FZ8A-SJSH].

250

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 40: 2

over Trump by a record 15 points.8 By many accounts we are the
most divided as a country since the Civil War.9
There were and are questions being posed about whether our
democracy and its institutions can survive this intense and toxic
degree of polarization. Research shows that voters are more
animated and energized by opposing the other party than
supporting their own policy preferences.10 A political leader of an
opposition party supporting a bill leads to sharp opposition,
regardless of the content of the bill.11
We are divided by geography, race, and gender, but also by
facts. One only has to look at the struggle over the virus and mask
wearing to get a sense of how deeply we are divided by facts.12 But
it extends also to beliefs about whether the election was
fraudulently stolen or the reality of climate change.13 Some amount
of disagreement on basic scientific or empirical facts may indeed be
healthy, but we have long since passed that point. It is clear that
polarization in our contemporary American democracy has devolved
into a clear example of extensive factional divisions. Quite often
when discussing the notion of factional divisions, we fail to
understand that these very divisions have the ability to ignite
conflict and intertwine social and political identities regardless of
geographic location.14 This refusal to acknowledge the severity of
factionalism within American democracy makes the system
susceptible to manipulation by “enterprising politicians at home
and malevolent adversaries abroad.”15

8. Zachary B. Wolf, Curt Merrill & Daniel Wolfe, How Voters Shifted During
Four Years of Trump, CNNPOLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/11/
politics/election-analysis-exit-polls-2016-2020/ [https://perma.cc/G8U8-7648].
9. Julia Manchester, Analyst Says US is Most Divided Since Civil War, HILL
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/409718-analystsays-the-us-is-the-most-divided-since-the-civl-war [https://perma.cc/7C4H-8AVZ].
10. Stephen P. Nicholson, Polarizing Cues, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 52, 64 (2012).
11. Id. at 56–59.
12. Carroll Doherty, Jocelyn Kiley & Nida Asheer, Republicans, Democrats Move
Even Further Apart in Coronavirus Concerns, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 25, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/06/25/republicans-democrats-move-evenfurther-apart-in-coronavirus-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/JQ6K-MBKQ].
13. See Zilinsky et al., supra note 3, for beliefs about the stolen election. See
Deborah Lynn Guber, A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the
Politics of Global Warming, 57 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 93, 98 (2012), for a dispute of
climate change facts.
14. Reuben E. Brigety II, The Fractured Power: How to Overcome Tribalism,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2021-02-16/fractured-power [https://perma.cc/XLJ8-XQSQ].
15. Id.
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Trump, before stepping back, reportedly considered declaring
martial law and asking the states to nullify the elections.16 He also
pressured members of Congress and the Vice President to refuse to
accept the certified results of the state’s electoral college votes.17 Not
only was he able to get many elected officials to support these
positions, many of the 74 million Americans that supported him also
supported these positions. I could go on, but my point is that the
polarization that has engulfed us, and indeed much of the world, did
not go away because of the election and the end of the calendar
year.18
While there will be disagreement as to the major cause for the
polarization, I believe there are a number of factors that work
together. Some of these reasons include rapid change in the spheres
of technology, demographics, climate, and the economy. These
underlying conditions will continue to challenge us. I will assert
that these changes are not just impacting our condition, but also
who we are—our individual and collective identities. We are
experiencing not just a physical threat but also an ontological
threat.19
While I will explore some of these issues below, the primary
focus of this Article will be on how we move forward to depolarize
our society. I will focus especially on one of the most frequently
suggested methods, one with which I have been associated.20 I am

16. Felicia Sonmez, Josh Dawsey, Dan Lamothe & Matt Zapotosky, A Frustrated
Trump Redoubles Efforts to Overturn Election Result, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/tuberville-electoral-challenge-trumpconversation/2020/12/20/1658573e-42db-11eb-b0e4-0f182923a025_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7WPM-7RBP]; see also Toluse Olorunnipa, Josh Dawsey, Rosalind
S. Helderman & Emma Brown, Trump Assembles a Ragtag Crew of ConspiracyMinded Allies in Flailing Bid to Reverse Election Loss, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-assembles-a-ragtag-crew-ofconspiracy-minded-allies-in-flailing-bid-to-reverse-electionloss/2020/12/21/d7674cd2-43b2-11eb-b0e4-0f182923a025_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7G7E-25AL].
17. Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Says Pence Can Overturn His Loss in Congress.
That’s Not How It Works., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election.html [https://perma.cc/T5LX-49TU].
18. See john a. powell, Foreword to TRUMPISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Osagie K.
Obasogie ed., 2020), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/trumpism-and-its-discontents/
foreword [https://perma.cc/P67H-CTYP] [hereinafter powell, Foreword].
19. See JOHN A. POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING OUR CONCEPTIONS
OF SELF AND OTHER TO BUILD AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY 135–62, 197–228 (2012)
[hereinafter POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE].
20. john a. powell, Bridging or Breaking? The Stories We Tell Will Create the
Future We Inhabit, NONPROFIT Q. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
bridging-or-breaking-the-stories-we-tell-will-create-the-future-we-inhabit/ [https://
perma.cc/V344-887B] [hereinafter powell, Bridging or Breaking?].
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referring to “bridging” as an approach to address polarization and
move us to the concept of belonging.21 Bridging entails engaging
with people who hold different views, values, or identities.22
The call for bridging, even if that exact term is not used, is
rapidly expanding in the United States and beyond.23 I will assert
that bridging in support of belonging can be a valuable tool but that
it cannot do its work unless it is grounded in a more nuanced frame
than is sometimes acknowledged. Part of this nuance is to situate
bridging both in the context of structures and power.
There have been some efforts in this direction in the larger
context of social capital, the theory of resources and power that
exists through social relationships.24 But these insights have
largely been absent from the current push for bridging adopted by
certain activist circles. This absence may be a critical reason for the
attractiveness of bridging discourse in various parts of our society
today. The failure to engage structures and power will mean almost
certain failure to overcome the deep toxic polarization that we are
facing. While activists are likely to have an analysis of power, their
demands that addressing power dynamics be a precondition for
working across divides can have the effect of indefinitely postponing
bridging.25

21. Rachel Heydemann & john a. powell, On Bridging: Evidence and Guidance
from Real-World Cases, OTHERING & BELONGING INST. (Aug. 19, 2020),
https://belonging.berkeley.edu/on-bridging [https://perma.cc/3AZ9-BR8W].
22. john a. powell on How Bridging Creates Conditions to Solve Problems,
OTHERING & BELONGING INST. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/
john-powell-how-bridging-creates-conditions-solve-problems
[https://perma.cc/7AUY-QTNM].
23. E.g.,
Weave:
The
Social
Fabric
Project,
ASPEN
INST.,
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/weave-the-social-fabric-initiative/ [https://
perma.cc/2MD4-E6JM].
24. See, e.g., Tristan Claridge, Explanation of Types of Social Capital, SOC. CAP.
RSCH. (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/explanation-typessocial-capital/ [https://perma.cc/27QA-2QUA] (contrasting “linking” and “bridging”
social capital based upon gradients of power).
25. There are some theorists who have raised this issue of power, but they are
not generally part of the folks embracing bridging nor deeply engaged in activism.
They include folks such as Derik Gelderblom, Jennifer McCoy, Benjamin Press,
Murat Somer, and Ozlem Tuncel. See Derik Gelderblom, The Limits to Bridging
Social Capital: Power, Social Context and the Theory of Robert Putnam, 66 SOCIO.
REV. 1309 (2018); Jennifer McCoy, Benjamin Press, Murat Somer & Ozlem Tuncel,
Reducing Pernicious Polarization: A Comparative Historical Analysis of
Depolarization (May 5, 20220) (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Working
Paper). A frequently asked question is if we can bridge and break at the same time.
And while undoubtedly the answer is yes, at some point, the breaking undermines
bridging. Putnam addresses this in part through the lens of bonding. See ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
402–14 (2001) [hereinafter PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE]. He notes that when one is
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Many activists and community organizers are predisposed
toward skepticism of bridging and perhaps even the larger theory
of social capital.26 Part of the reluctance is grounded in the
foundational position of power building that is core for many
activists. From this perspective, the challenge to bridging becomes
not a call for correction but a rejection of the underlying objective.
It is only a slight exaggeration to suggest that at one pole there are
those calling for bridging without addressing power to be the
principal way to solve polarization. At the other pole is the rejection
of bridging either outright or to load up the preconditions for
bridging so that it effectively makes bridging a complete nonstarter.27 It is these positions that this Article attempts to resolve
by suggesting other possibilities. I believe we must consider the
issue of power to make bridging meaningful. But I also believe that
putting on a number of preconditions before we begin the process of
bridging would also be a mistake. I will also discuss the different
goals we might have for bridging.
In the next part of the Article, I discuss the problem of
polarization in more detail, and then relate polarization to various
identity expressions. Following that, I will briefly lay out some
parameters of bridging, bonding, and breaking and how they relate
to addressing polarization on one hand and promoting belonging on
the other. I will attempt to show that the failure to engage the issue
of power and structural contexts will greatly limit the efficacy of
these efforts. I will then look at the issue of power as raised by some
organizers and suggest a reexamination of power and how to begin
to bridge even as we struggle with the issues of power and
structures. I will suggest this is emergent which will have to be
learned and corrected by doing. But while it is critical to address
power, I will also assert that to delay the process of bridging in the
hope of first establishing equal power is not productive. Instead,
tied deeply to one’s own group, it is more likely that one will exclude other groups.
Id.
26. Humnath Bhandari & Kumi Yasunobu, What is Social Capital? A
Comprehensive Review of the Concept, 37 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 480, 484–85 (2009).
27. For a discussion of the call to bridge in the complete absence of power
analysis, there has been a growing chorus of scholars and public intellectuals
demanding that people’s identities be set aside to come together over “universal
issues,” embodied most notably in Mark Lilla’s New York Times article on identity
politics, Mark Lilla, The End of Identity Liberalism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identityliberalism.html [https://perma.cc/W2WS-63KF]. See Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Being-in-theRoom-Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference, PHILOSOPHER (OCT. 30,
2020), https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/essay-taiwo [https://perma.cc/82S4Z5JA], for a critique of the perceived need to load up on preconditions before bridging
can occur that takes place in some organizing circles.
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what I suggest is that even while one attends to the issue of power,
one must also be willing to explore bridging.
II. Polarization and Politics
After the murder of George Floyd, there was a series of global
social justice demonstrations, unprecedented in scale and diversity
of participants.28 Millions of Americans across the United States
and supporters across the globe took to the streets in support of
Black Lives and demanded racial justice. From small towns to
boardrooms of some of the wealthiest corporations in the world,
there was both a call for racial justice and a deep stirring not to shy
away from a profound focus on anti-Black racism. People of all races
and virtually every sector participated.
This effort was more than just demonstrating; there was also
an outpouring of money and commitment to an unprecedented
extent in the United States.29 This is all the more impressive as
there was no single leadership or organization at the head of these
protests.30 The best-selling books for weeks focused on better
understanding and addressing anti-Black racism. The terms “antiBlack racism,” “systemic racism,” and “white supremacy” were used
by heads of state, police chiefs, and others more often associated
with maintaining the status quo than advocating for racial justice.31
President Biden, in his inaugural address, made a commitment to
address white supremacy.32 This was the first time that a president
had publicly used the term.
28. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/4279-7SWR] (detailing the protests that occurred throughout the
United States following George Floyd’s murder).
29. See, e.g., Shane Goldmacher, Racial Justice Groups Flooded with Millions in
Donations in Wake of Floyd Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/us/politics/black-lives-matter-racismdonations.html [https://perma.cc/WQ3S-URQU] (discussing the record volume of
donations sent to racial justice causes and bail funds in the wake of the murder of
George Floyd).
30. See, e.g., Ruschell Boone, As George Floyd Protests in NYC Became More
Organized, the Leaders Got Younger, SPECTRUM NEWS (July 1, 2020),
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2020/07/01/george-floyd-protests-nycleaders-who-are-they [https://perma.cc/MK2W-C53S] (indicating that protestors in
New York and nationally had no central figure leading the movement).
31. See, e.g., Justin Worland, America’s Long Overdue Awakening to Systemic
Racism, TIME (June 11, 2020), https://time.com/5851855/systemic-racism-america/
[https://perma.cc/ND3A-C7CX] (noting that “mainstream conservatives like former
President George W. Bush join[ed] moderate democrats like Joe Biden” in embracing
the term “systemic racism” and calling for “a national reckoning”).
32. President Joseph R. Biden, Inaugural Address at the United States Capitol
(Jan. 20, 2021).
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Yet, only a few weeks earlier, on January 6, 2021, a large group
of Trump supporters attacked the capital with the goal of stopping
or disrupting the transfer of the presidential power.33 General
Mattis, who was the Secretary of Defense under Trump, warned of
the growing threat of white nationalism and white supremacy, in
part reflected in the insurrection.34 He also noted that Trump
clearly shoulders some of the responsibility.35 Other former aides
and staffers for Trump have expressed similar concern, as had the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.36
I cite these examples in particular to demonstrate that this
concern is not coming just from Democrats or the political left, but
from neutral observers. To have a sitting president push for an
insurrection in the transfer of power is unheard of in the American
context. It is this action that led to Congress impeaching Trump for
an historic and unprecedented second time.37 Despite this, Trump
continues to gather wide support. Not only did more than 70 million
Americans vote for him—the second largest number in history—
even after his first impeachment, 68% of Republicans signaled
support for his running for office again, and more than 55%
indicated they would support his potential candidacy.38 In addition,
76% believe the election was stolen or had substantial fraud, with a

33. Dan Barry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, ‘Our President Wants Us
Here’: The Mob That Stormed the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html [https://perma.cc/S9SCWCCD].
34. See Jeffrey Goldberg, James Mattis Denounces President Trump, Describes
Him as a Threat to the Constitution, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2020), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/james-mattis-denounces-trump-protests-milit
arization/612640/ [https://perma.cc/TDE5-V7MB].
35. Amanda Macias, Mattis Blames Trump for Violence at Capitol, Says His
Actions ‘Poison Our Respect for Fellow Citizens’, CNBC (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/06/mattis-blames-trump-for-violence-at-capitol-sayshis-actions-poison-our-respect-for-fellow-citizens.html
[https://perma.cc/UXA8FGLR].
36. See, e.g., Aaron C. Davis, Red Flags: As Trump Propelled His Supporters to
Washington, Law Enforcement Agencies Failed to Heed Mounting Warnings about
Violence on Jan. 6, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/interactive/2021/warnings-jan-6-insurrection/
[https://perma.cc/23CKGG93] (describing the red flags officials at the Department of Homeland Security,
the FBI, and other agencies witnessed indicating that supporters of Trump were
planning violence leading up to January 6th).
37. H.R. 24, 177th Cong. (2021).
38. Elaina Plott & Shane Goldmacher, Trump Wins CPAC Straw Poll, but Only
68 Percent Want Him to Run Again, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/28/us/politics/cpac-straw-poll-2024-presidentialrace.html [https://perma.cc/AY76-A4WD].
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sizable number supporting extralegal action to right what they
perceive as a wrong.39
I cite these facts not to legitimize these beliefs but to set the
context to understand the nature of the polarization that the
country faces. By many accounts, the country has not been this
divided since the Civil War.40 And while there is not a clear
consensus on the nature and cause of the divide, there are some
aspects that most people agree on. One of the axes of the divide is
politics. At this juncture there is a sharp divide between those who
identify as Democrats and Republicans.41
It is sometimes assumed that polarization is a byproduct of
ignorance, as if it were just people misunderstanding or not
knowing each other.42 One need only to look at the Senate to
recognize the fallacy of this assumption. Many of the people who are
there have known each other for decades.43 And some of the most
significant enablers of a stolen election and the victimhood of white
America are people who, at times, have been both very clear and
critical of Trump’s destructive and divisive ideology.44 Yet, many of
these folks have deeply aligned themselves with Trump and
Trumpism.45 Party affiliation, as this evidence demonstrates, is one
of the societal divides that indicates polarization, but it goes much
deeper than that.
39. Chris Cillizza, Three-Quarters of Republicans Believe a Lie about the 2020
Election, CNNPOLITICS (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/04/politics/2020
-election-donald-trump-voter-fraud/index.html [https://perma.cc/G9NH-5XGP].
40. Manchester, supra note 9.
41. See DeSilver, supra note 1 (describing the polarization of Congress that has
widened since the 1970s).
42. See, e.g., Isabella Nassar, We Are Way Too Polarized, HEIGHTS (Oct. 24,
2021), https://www.bcheights.com/2021/10/24/we-are-way-too-polarized/ [https://
perma.cc/JS2Q-AWL9] (arguing that open-mindedness and addressing ignorance is
a solution for polarization).
43. Cf. Bridget Mulcahy & Mackenzie Weinger, 25 Longest-Serving Senators,
POLITICO (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.politico.com/gallery/25-longest-servingsenators?slide=0 [https://perma.cc/F2ML-99UA] (listing senators who served in
Congress for decades, some of whom overlapped); List of Current Members of the U.S.
Congress, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_current_members_of_the_
U.S._Congress [https://perma.cc/YCX9-NFNC] (providing the length of time current
Senators have served).
44. See, e.g., Madeline Conway, 9 Times Ted Cruz Insulted Donald Trump Before
Endorsing Him, POLITICO (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/
ted-cruz-donald-trump-insults-endorse-228594
[https://perma.cc/ZDU6-AC9H]
(detailing times Ted Cruz, a later supporter of the stolen election theory, was highly
critical of Trump).
45. See, e.g., David Drucker, Book Excerpt: How Ted Cruz Was Converted to
Trumpism, FOX NEWS (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ted-cruzconverted-trumpism [https://perma.cc/HE2Y-2N63] (describing Ted Cruz’s
alignment with Trumpism).
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III. Polarization and Identity
The previous section clearly shows that political polarization
is intensifying, as the two major political parties embody a growing
divide. But they straddle many other divides, including those of
race, religion, national origin, urban/rural, sexual orientation, and
much more. One’s party affiliation stands for more than just one’s
position on issues and policies. The Republican Party, especially
since Nixon, has been tinged by a strategy that appealed to white
voters, the “southern” strategy and “dog whistle politics,” but more
recently flirted with white supremacy and white nationalism.46 The
Republican Party is no longer the party of Lincoln but the party of
Trump.
It is not just Trump’s reaction to the white nationalist march
in Charlottesville47 or his call for the Proud Boys to “stand back and
stand by,”48 but that Trump has espoused consistent hostility to
people of color, immigrants, and Muslims. In his first official speech
declaring his candidacy for President, he attacked both immigrants
and Muslims.49 He has a track record of denigrating Black public
figures as having a “low IQ,” such as CNN anchor Don Lemon or
Congresswoman Maxine Waters, a virulent racist trope.50
These tendencies are found not just in his rhetoric, but in his
policies and views of his allies. Many of his high-level advisors, from
Steve Bannon to Steve Miller, have long histories of being affiliated
with reactionary and fringe political movements, even neo-Nazis, or
have been credibly accused.51 Many extremist groups and their
46. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2015)
(providing a background on racial politics and the middle class).
47. See Glenn Kessler, The ‘Very Fine People’ at Charlottesville: Who Were They?,
WASH. POST (May 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/08/
very-fine-people-charlottesville-who-were-they-2/
[https://perma.cc/28SY-CWQ7]
(discussing the violence in Charlottesville and Trump’s response).
48. Courtney Subramanian & Jordan Culver, Donald Trump Sidesteps Call to
Condemn White Supremacists—and the Proud Boys Were ‘Extremely Excited’ About
It, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
elections/2020/09/29/trump-debate-white-supremacists-stand-back-standby/3583339001/ [https://perma.cc/B7CM-MZH4].
49. TIME Staff, Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,
TIME (June 16, 2015), https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcementspeech/ [https://perma.cc/KA95-Z4W6].
50. Davis Smith, Trump’s Tactic to Attack Black People and Women: Insult Their
Intelligence, GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/aug/10/trump-attacks-twitter-black-people-women [https://perma.cc/
684F-RPCW].
51. Tina Nguyen, Steve Bannon Has a Nazi Problem, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 12,
2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/09/steve-bannon-has-a-nazi-problem
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leaders viewed Trump as their savior, leader, or guiding political
force. Neo-Nazi Richard Spencer, for example, celebrated Trump’s
election and his post-Charlottesville equivocations by shouting “hail
Trump.”52 An entirely new movement, known as Q’Anon, similarly
views Trump as a savior and promulgated extreme theories about
Jews and Democrats trying to take over America.53 In the attack on
the Capitol, white supremacist, Nazi, and confederate symbols and
icons were proudly displayed.54 These groups have supported
Trump, and Trump has emboldened them. One of the great divides
in the country today is support or non-support for Trumpism.55 The
Republican party can then be thought of as a party organized
around white nationalism and white supremacy.
In terms of policies promulgated by the Trump administration,
they, too, were largely consistent with an ideology of white
supremacy and white nationalism. The centerpiece initiative of the
Trump candidacy was the “wall” with Mexico, which was never
built.56 Instead, the Trump administration adopted a series of
brutal and dehumanizing anti-immigration policies, including those
that separated young migrants from their parents.57 In addition to
this, the Trump administration initiated the largest drawdown of
[https://perma.cc/PDF5-4YSY]; Michael Edison Hayden, Stephen Miller’s Affinity for
White Nationalism Revealed in Leaked Emails, SPLC (Nov. 12, 2019),
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/11/12/stephen-millers-affinity-whitenationalism-revealed-leaked-emails [https://perma.cc/NXF7-MTL3].
52. Aleem Maqbool, Hail Trump: White Nationalists Mark Trump Win with Nazi
Salute, BBC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada38057104/hail-trump-white-nationalists-mark-trump-win-with-nazi-salute
[https://perma.cc/Z2K6-C34E].
53. Ewan Palmer, QAnon Believers Have Lost Their Savior in Trump, But
Conspiracy Theory is Building Power in GOP, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.newsweek.com/qanon-conspiracy-trump-future-election-biden-1544462
[https://perma.cc/9NGS-AXMR].
54. Matthew Rosenberg & Ainara Tiefenthäler, Decoding the Far-Right Symbols
at the Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/
13/video/extremist-signs-symbols-capitol-riot.html [https://perma.cc/J76P-V7RU].
55. See Michael Dimock & John Gramlich, How America Changed During
Trump’s Presidency, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/
2021/01/29/how-america-changed-during-donald-trumps-presidency/
[https://perma.cc/JY5R-UYXH] (describing the deeply partisan and personal divides
caused by Trump’s presidency).
56. See, e.g., Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, Trump Wall: How Much Has He
Actually Built?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-46824649 [https://perma.cc/B4SY-ASYM]; Simon Romero & Zolan KannoYoungs, Trump’s Incomplete Border Wall Is in Pieces that Could Linger for Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/us/border-walltrump-biden.html [https://perma.cc/S7H3-D5LT].
57. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Trump and Aides Drove Family Separation at
Border, Documents Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
01/14/us/politics/trump-family-separation.html [https://perma.cc/QF7R-Y5GZ].
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the refugee resettlement program, bringing it to its lowest level in
generations.58
Perhaps the most offensive executive order issued by the
Trump administration was the so-called “Muslim Travel Ban,” a
series of executive orders that restricted travel to the United States
from heavily Muslim countries.59 Although courts struck down the
first two iterations, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the third
version, a decision that may well prove notorious.60
In addition to anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant policy, the
Trump administration jettisoned both the Obama-era Fair Housing
regulations relating to the federal duty to “affirmatively further fair
housing” and govern “disparate impact” claims.61 The Trump
administration also implemented a broad rule restricting the scope
of federal anti-racism curriculum, in addition to characterizing
Black Lives Matter protestors as terrorists or criminals.62
Another cleavage that maps to the political divide is between
rural and urban populations. Rural, in this context, is used as a
stand in for low education whites. Urban is used as a stand in for
mixed race and more educated populations. Despite these
heuristics, it is clear that rural voters turned out in record numbers
to support Trump, while urban areas were heavily Democratic
leaning.63
58. Bobby Allyn, Trump Administration Drastically Cuts Number of Refugees
Allowed to Enter the U.S., NPR (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/
764839236/trump-administration-drastically-cuts-number-of-refugees-allowed-toenter-the-u [https://perma.cc/J579-X7PN].
59. Stephen Menendian, Refugee and Immigration Executive Order is
Unconstitutional and Antithetical to a Fair and Inclusive Society, OTHERING &
BELONGING INST. (Feb. 3, 2017), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/refugee-andimmigration-executive-order-unconstitutional-and-antithetical-fair-and-inclusivesociety [https://perma.cc/2PWK-T4MG].
60. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). It is notable that in the same
decision, the Court overruled Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), as if
overturning that notorious precedent could shield it from history’s sharp glare.
61. Stephen Menendian, Disparate Impact Liability Is the Best Remedy for
Structural Racism, U.C. BERKELEY: BERKELEY BLOG (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2019/10/22/disparate-impact-liability-is-the-best-remedyfor-structural-racism/ [https://perma.cc/W23V-993Z]; Stephen Menendian, Fair
Housing and Affordable Housing Are Not the Same Thing, U.C. BERKELEY:
BERKELEY BLOG (Jan. 8, 2020), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2020/01/08/fair-housingand-affordable-housing-are-not-the-same-thing-the-trump-administrations-latestattack-on-integration/ [https://perma.cc/W23V-993Z].
62. Stephen Menendian, Why Trump’s Diversity Training Ban is
Unconstitutional, U.C. BERKELEY: BERKELEY BLOG (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2020/10/16/why-trumps-diversity-training-ban-isunconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/9S4Y-EVL7].
63. Hannah Love & Tracy Hadden Loh, The ‘Rural Urban Divide’ Furthers Myths
about Race and Poverty – Concealing Effective Policy Solutions, BROOKINGS INST.
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There have been a number of books and articles trying to
better understand the growing polarization grounded in white and
ethnic supremacy and nationalism and what can be done about it.64
One of the big divides in liberal circles is to insist that polarization
is either class-based, culture-based, or race-based.65 Many of these
efforts assume that there is one primary cause and that other
expressions of these phenomena are a result of that cause. So, for
example, in the assertion that polarization is economically based,
the argument goes that the economic anxiety caused by
globalization and inequality has been exploited by the elites, in this
case Trump, to stir up racism. Therefore, the conclusion that follows
is that if we can fix economic inequality, the racial tension will
largely go away. This argument suggests that whites continue to
organize and vote against their self-interest, and a strong economic
and inclusive narrative is what we must adopt. The more stringent
version of this story is to not talk about race because it only further
alienates this population and that most of the racial concerns are
really economic concerns.66
There are others who insist that the primary driver for our
problem is grounded in racism.67 At the edges it suggests that all
whites engage in racial resentment, which implies that resentment
is always latent and can be activated under the proper
circumstances. There are two factors that make this activation more
robust. One factor is the changing demographics resulting in a
decrease in the white majority.68 Relatedly, the other factor is that
any improvement in conditions, especially for Black people, is seen
as a decline in white people’s well-being.69 The decline need not be
(2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/12/08/the-rural-urbandivide-furthers-myths-about-race-and-poverty-concealing-effective-policy-solutions/
[https://perma.cc/P6M5-LS48].
64. See Carlos Lozada, The United Hates of America, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/30/polarization-books-trumpelection/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/442E-GJYN].
65. See, e.g., Michael Powell, A Black Marxist Scholar Wanted to Talk About
Race. It Ignited a Fury., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
08/14/us/adolph-reed-controversy.html [https://perma.cc/D5AM-WV3S] [hereinafter
Powell, Black Marxist Scholar].
66. Id.
67. See id. (mentioning that some see racism as the root of the issue).
68. See, e.g., Brittany Farr, A Demographic Moral Panic: Fears of a MajorityMinority Future and the Depreciating Value of Whiteness, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
(Aug.
16,
2021),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2021/08/16/rrs-farrdemographic/ [https://perma.cc/Z7ZP-ZWKQ].
69. See, e.g., Heather McGhee & Ezra Klein, What ‘Drained-Pool’ Politics Costs
America, N.Y. TIMES: EZRA KLEIN SHOW (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/02/16/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-heather-mcghee.html
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material or even real, suggesting that white people’s status over
Black people and others is paramount. This position partially
explains how some white people could vote for Obama then Trump;
as long as Black people are not seen as a threat, it is acceptable,
even morally praiseworthy, to vote for the first Black President.
What changed—what Trump and others were able to do—was to
activate both a sense of threat and resentment, partly from the
ascendance of Obama himself to the presidency.70
There are many other variants of these arguments, including
a cultural theory that ultimately backs into identity politics, but
indirectly. The notion of “identity politics” is often brought up to
challenge the legitimacy of a group’s position: to attack
marginalized groups’ calls or demands as if there are larger and
possibly more important issues that should receive focus. Any
instance of people of color raising issues or bringing up matters that
are important to them but are not “universal” or are possibly even
divisive is often labeled “identity politics.”71
Implicit in these critiques is an assumption that if we could
focus on the “real” issues like the economy or the environment, we
could unify. This argument came up often in the 1920s and 1930s
in the context of the NAACP pushing for an anti-lynching law.72 A
more recent version of this assertion comes up in relation to the
#MeToo movement by women or the challenge to policing or
racialized mass incarceration from Black Lives Matter (BLM)
protestors.73 The burden is placed on these groups to avoid identity

[https://perma.cc/X6N9-G6LJ].
70. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY: THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND
THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT (2018) (examining how an increasing demand for
recognition of one’s identity has led to the emergence of populist nationalism and the
implications of “identities” being defined in progressively narrower forms).
71. Mycah Denzel Smith, What Liberals Get Wrong about Identity Politics, NEW
REPUBLIC
(2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/144739/liberals-get-wrongidentity-politics [https://perma.cc/N78B-HEQQ].
72. NAACP’s Anti-Lynching Campaigns: The Quest for Social Justice in the
Interwar Years, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR HUMANS., https://edsitement.neh.gov/
curricula/naacps-anti-lynching-campaigns-quest-social-justice-interwar-years
[https://perma.cc/U25X-NAH5].
73. See, e.g., David French, There Is a Profound Difference Between Justice and
Identity Politics, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/01/
metoo-movement-meaning-beyond-identity-politics/ [https://perma.cc/W2N8-RJ3S]
(claiming that “[t]he #MeToo movement must choose between an allegiance to
identity politics and the pursuit of justice”); Eljeer Hawkins, Black Lives Matter and
Marxism, SOCIALIST ALT. (Feb. 2015), https://www.socialistalternative.org/marxismfight-black-freedom/black-lives-matter-marxism/
[https://perma.cc/N25N-8ZS6]
(discussing how the Black Lives Matter movement can benefit from incorporating a
class-based approach).
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politics, as these politics are both seen as polarizing and even
petty.74
This is a kind of weaponized identity politics in service of the
dominant group. As Francis Fukuyama and others have asserted,
all politics are identity politics.75 The journalist Ezra Klein asserts
that “[u]nfortunately the term ‘identity politics’ has been
weaponized. It is most often used by speakers to describe politics as
practiced by members of historically marginalized groups. If [you
are] black and [you are] worried about police brutality, [that is]
identity politics.”76 This position is clearly problematic. The
underlying concern of those who broadly attack some groups for
engaging in identity politics is breaking and polarization, a concern
to which I will return later.77
Despite four years of the Trump presidency, many of these
debates remain unresolved. It is clear, however, that leadership and
narrative play a significant role in the processes that engender
polarization across identity boundaries, which is why politics is
often intertwined. Some argue that white resentment has always
been there, and that Trump just gave it permission to come out.
There may be some truth in this position, but there are reasons to
believe it is radically overstated.
IV. White Supremacy and Racial Heterogeneity
The white resentment that builds on white nationalism and
white supremacy is at least as old as the country itself. It has
expressed itself in different ways at different times.78 Some will
read this to mean that this expression of racism is inevitable and
that it is just what America is. That reading would be a serious
mistake. America has always been many things, and it is not
preordained which one will come to dominate. At times, our leaders
have tamped down or shifted views. At other times, they have
inflamed passions and stoked fear.79 Much depends on which
74. See Alicia Garza, Identity Politics: Friend or Foe?, OTHERING & BELONGING
INST. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/identity-politics-friend-or-foe
[https://perma.cc/BD3B-7RVF].
75. FUKUYAMA, supra note 70, at 105–09.
76. KLEIN, supra note 2, at xx–xxi.
77. See Denzel Smith, supra note 71. See powell, Bridging or Breaking?, supra
note 20, for a discussion of breaking.
78. See generally DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 2007) (examining the
development of white working-class racism in the United States).
79. Examples abound from history, but consider President Lyndon Johnson’s
efforts to pass civil rights legislation despite hostility to equal rights earlier in his
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narratives prevail and which messages win out: our better angels
or our darkest demons.
White supremacy and its cousin, white and Christian
nationalism, are not descriptive of people’s phenotype but of an
ideology. You do not have to be white to embrace white supremacy,
nor do all white people embrace white supremacy or white
nationalism. Indeed, there is a great deal of survey data to suggest
that American attitudes on race have at times gotten substantially
more inclusive and more open to things like integration and
interracial marriage.80
Many wrongly assumed that Americans would not support a
Black person running for president. Obama won handily not once
but twice. While it is true that he did not get the majority of white
voters, he did as well as other Democratic presidential candidates.
People are still trying to make sense of the large number of people,
especially white people, that voted for Obama and then voted for
Trump.81 While all the reasons might not be obvious, it is clear that
racial attitude, and by extension racial polarization, continues to
shift.
There is no monolith among whites, Blacks, or any other
group. What may look like a solid racial divide is always more
complicated. Some would make the divide or racial issue more of a
geographic issue.82 Where that geography should be drawn is not
entirely clear. Certainly, the south is deeply associated with white
dominance, the legacy of Jim Crow, and all of the connotations that
accrue to it.83
political career. See ROBERT CARO, THE LYNDON JOHNSON YEARS (1982–2012)
(detailing the life and political career of former President Lyndon Johnson in a multivolume biography). Consider also political figures like George Wallace who built his
political career on stoking racial division. See powell, Foreword, supra note 18.
80. See, e.g., Justin McCarthy, U.S. Approval of Interracial Marriage at New
High of 94%, GALLUP (Sept. 10, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/354638/approvalinterracial-marriage-new-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z38V-PX8V] (tracking the
increase in approval of Black-white interracial marriage in the United States).
81. See, e.g., Zack Beauchamp, A New Study Reveals the Real Reason Obama
Voters Switched to Trump, VOX (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/10/16/17980820/trump-obama-2016-race-racism-class-economy-2018midterm [https://perma.cc/9PBN-64SN].
82. See, e.g., Sarah Savat, The Divide Between Us: Urban-Rural Political
Differences
Rooted
in
Geography,
NEWSROOM
(Feb.
18,
2020),
https://source.wustl.edu/2020/02/the-divide-between-us-urban-rural-politicaldifferences-rooted-in-geography/
[https://perma.cc/98PK-XHQS]
(previewing
Andrew J. Reeves’ study finding that proximity to big cities carries greater import
than individual identities in driving the political divide).
83. See generally GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE
OF SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1940 (2010) (tracing how white southerners reestablished their position over newly freed Black people following the Civil War and
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We have an historical sense that the Civil War had at least
three dominant parties: Democrats, Republicans, and the south.
While Democrats and Republicans have shifted positions on race
and civil rights, the south has been more predictably opposed to civil
rights and embracing white dominance.84 The suburbs have been a
northern proxy for the south. Republicans have organized around
the use of racial resentment and fear to make the suburbs a
Republican stronghold.85 And most of the effort to integrate schools
in the United States has been at odds with the northern suburbs.86
Some say the Civil Rights Movement did not die in the south
but in Cicero, a white working-class Chicago suburb.87 But then we
just had an election in the old, solid south where a Black man and
a Jewish man won Senate seats. Not only did they perform well in
the deep south, they performed well in many Georgian suburbs.88
Still there is much polarized voting in the United States, certainly
more than the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when it gutted the
Voting Rights Act,89 but not as much as Trump and Republicans
expected in the last presidential election.90
The debates over race, class, and geography described in the
previous part of this Article founder on a few crucial shoals.91 While
much of the identity over class as cause seems right at an
experiential and empirical level, much of this analysis does not
adequately account for the constructedness and, at times, the
fluidity of race. White identity is not just constructed, it is also
how modern “whiteness” came to be).
84. See powell, New Southern Strategy, supra note 6.
85. Id.
86. See GREGORY S. JACOBS, GETTING AROUND BROWN: DESEGREGATION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE COLUMBUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 163 (1998).
87. See, e.g., Samuel Momodu, The Cicero Riot of 1951, BLACKPAST (Jan. 22,
2022), https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/events-african-american
-history/the-cicero-riot-of-1951/ [https://perma.cc/RT6J-38GA] (describing the riot
that took place in the Chicago suburb of Cicero, where “a mob of approximately 4,000
whites attacked an apartment building an African American family had recently
moved into”).
88. Nate Cohn, Why Warnock and Ossoff Won in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/upshot/warnock-ossoff-georgiavictories.html [https://perma.cc/P7PY-H2TQ].
89. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
90. Some would explain Georgia by looking at the changing demographic and the
increase in the number of Black voters in Georgia as well as their higher-thannormal participation both in the general and special elections. Still many whites in
the suburbs broke from Trump and from the Republicans in the runoff. See Nate
Cohn, Matthew Conlen & Charlie Smart, Detailed Turnout Data Shows How Georgia
Turned Blue, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
11/17/upshot/georgia-precinct-shift-suburbs.html [https://perma.cc/885C-DB5M].
91. See Powell, Black Marxist Scholar, supra note 65.
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elastic, encompassing groups formerly known as non-white (such as
the Irish, Italians, or Armenians), or racializing groups formerly
white as non-white.92 It is conceivable that who is white can be
expanding so that despite demographic shifts white majority status
is maintained indefinitely.93
What is also taken for granted is that there will not only be a
coherent group understood as Black, but there will also be a fairly
coherent group of people of color. People of color, as a category,
includes all the groups that are not considered white. Clearly, the
sustainability and coherence of such a varied group is questionable.
This is important for addressing and understanding polarization
between groups. I will not say more about this issue here except to
note that most pundits interpret and create race as a fixture that is
permanent instead of contested processes that constantly change.94
V. Bridging and Contact Theory
This Article has asserted the existence of layered but varied
expressions of polarization. By many accounts the United States,
and much of the world, is experiencing not only heightened
intensity related to polarization, but also the difference in form,
given the overlapping of gender, racial, geographic, and political
polarization.95
In the United States, bridging has been one of the dominant if
not the primary process that has been called upon to address
polarization. There are a number of groups, including the one I
direct, that have advanced bridging to address polarization.96
Bridging can be described as looking for common ground, often
through deeply listening to others’ stories and pain.97
There are many ways to think of bridging. It is similar in some
ways to inter-group “contact theory” and the associated efforts to
address prejudice and stereotyping initiated from the research of
92. See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION
RACE (2d ed. 2006) (examining the construction of race and “whiteness” and the
flexibility that the concept of whiteness possesses).
93. See generally GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?: LATINOS, ASIANS, AND THE
NEW BLACK/NONBLACK DIVIDE (2003); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 92 (arguing that if
Latinx people become functionally white, then we will be more white in 2050 than
we are now).
94. One only has to look at the identity categories in the census. It is unusual for
them to be stable over any ten-year period. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 2014) (examining how concepts of
race are created, transformed, and used).
95. See powell, Bridging or Breaking?, supra note 20.
96. See Heydemann & powell, supra note 21.
97. See powell, Bridging or Breaking?, supra note 20.
OF
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Gordon Allport and modified and updated by Pettigrew and Tropp.98
In broad strokes, contact theory studies the conditions under which
inter-group contact will lead to cooperation rather than conflict.99
Some of the insights derived from this research have been presented
by the Supreme Court in important cases involving race and
diversity. For example, these underlying themes were crucial in the
University of Michigan affirmative action cases.100 In these cases,
various amici, especially the U.S. military, persuasively argued to
the Court that diversity enhanced the quality of leadership and
improved outcomes while reducing racial stereotypes.101 In this
sense, contact theory is based on the presupposition: “If only I knew
you better.” It is often associated with empathic listening or
practice.102
The concept of bridging is often associated with the
scholarship of Robert Putnam, whose work examines the
connections between diversity, trust, and community.103 In his most
famous book, Bowling Alone, Putnam addresses the need to bridge
with groups different than our own in order to build social capital
and for the smooth working of society.104 But before looking at the
dominant way of talking about and practicing bridging with an

98. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954)
(examining the roots of prejudice and discrimination); Thomas Fraser Pettigrew &
Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERS. SOC.
PSYCH. 751 (2006) (testing inter-group contact theory and building on Allport’s
scholarship); Tania Singer, Empathy and Compassion, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY R. 875
(2014) (analyzing empathy and compassion in a neuroscientific study). See Jim A. C.
Everett, Intergroup Contact Theory: Past, Present, and Future, INQUISITIVE MIND
(Diana Onu, ed., 2013), https://www.in-mind.org/article/intergroup-contact-theorypast-present-and-future [https://perma.cc/9DFR-WPVA], for a history.
99. Allport initially theorized four key conditions for positive intergroup effects:
equal status, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and support by social and
institutional authorities. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 98, at 752.
100. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
101. Joe R. Reeder, Military Amicus Brief Cited in Supreme Court’s Decision in
the University of Michigan Case, Grutter v. Bollinger, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
(June 27, 2003), https://www.gtlaw.com/en/news/2003/6/military-amicus-brief-citedin-supreme-courts-decision-in-the-university-of#main-content
[https://perma.cc/8GXD-LG6B].
102. See john a. powell, On How Bridging Creates Conditions to Solve Problems,
OTHERING & BELONGING INST. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/johnpowell-how-bridging-creates-conditions-solve-problems
[https://perma.cc/7AUYQTNM].
103. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-First Century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, SCANDINAVIAN POL.
STUDS. 137 (2007) [hereinafter Putnam, E Pluribus Unum].
104. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 25.
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important nod to Putnam, let us first look at some of the lessons
and discussions as it relates to contact theory.
While much of the work related to building cooperation and
social capital has raised issues as to the conditions necessary to
reduce prejudice, these efforts relate, as the term suggests, to
judgments made about people with insufficient information.105 But
many prejudices are more than interpersonal suspicions or simply
mistakes in judging one’s character. As more recent work has
shown, prejudices are social constructs that are doing some work for
society and that are reflected in structural norms and cultural
attitudes.106 One could even call them our collective mental habits.
They are often policed by laws and norms.
Still, these prejudices are easier to maintain under certain
conditions. Or, to put it differently, there should be some conditions
that cause prejudices to break down. One of those conditions is
contact.107 While it may be possible to hate under many conditions,
there is reason to believe it is easier at a distance. But contact alone
will not reduce prejudice. If we see groups in a role that confirms a
bias or stereotype, then contact can be counterproductive to bias
reduction.108 What we see must still be interpreted. Contact theory
has tried to address these concerns by exploring under what
conditions prejudice is reduced. These conditions include relative
equality between groups, goal sharing, and non-competition
between groups.109
Pettigrew goes further and asserts that this is not just a
process between individuals, but also that there is a role for
institutions and leaders.110 He maintains that people will try to
align with institutional norms and are especially impacted by the
leaders of their institution.111 Pettigrew also challenges the

105. See, e.g., Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 103, at 141 (“As we have
more contact with people who are unlike us, we overcome our initial hesitation and
ignorance and come to trust them more.”).
106. See Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 98.
107. See Everett, supra note 98.
108. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact Theory, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCH.
65, 68 (1998). But see Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 98, at 766 (“[C]onditions should
not be regarded as necessary for producing positive contact outcomes, as researchers
have often assumed in the past. Rather, they act as facilitating conditions that
enhance the tendency for positive contact outcomes to emerge.”).
109. There is not an agreed set of conditions, but there is a general agreement
that some conditions promote reduction in prejudice and others do not even when
there is contact. See Pettigrew, supra note 108, at 69–70.
110. See Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 98, at 766.
111. See id.
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presumption that the best way to change society is to work at the
individual level or that it is even the best place to start.112
Even in talking about the nature of prejudice and how to
overcome it, we have limited our inquiry. It is clear that much of
what is considered polarization is not a function of prejudice. The
limitation of a prejudice perspective is clearly demonstrated by the
work of political scientist Ashley Jardina. In her work studying
white identity formation and politics, she points to the need to focus
on the construction and maintenance of a shared identity and
interests within a group.113 While she acknowledges that reducing
intergroup racial conflict will to a degree require the addressing of
animus and outgroup prejudice, she asserts that this approach is
too concerned with individual attitudes.114 Rather, Jardina’s
research concludes, attention should be oriented to understanding
group identity formation—and in her work specifically, a growing
sense of and attachment to white identity.115 Many whites, she
finds, are growing more concerned with protecting group status and
positionality.116 This type of group favoritism does not require
animus toward an outgroup. Equally important, such group
identification is not individually based. Jardina traces the increase
in the salience of white identity to a threat that throws into question
the status of white hierarchy, which she contends does not need to
be material or real.117
Group identification and consciousness is similar to the
concept of bonding and, as noticed by Putnam and others, can lead
to exclusion and friction even without animus. To the extent that
bridging is focused on addressing prejudice, it will not engage
group-based solidarity and consciousness. Similarly, two groups
might be in sharp disagreement not because of prejudice but
because of interest, situatedness, or power. If that is the case, we
could not expect a shift in prejudice to do the work of addressing
polarization. This is the subject I will next address.
VI. Bridging and Power
The call for bridging is not an abstract exercise. All over the
United States, Europe, and many other parts of the world there
112. Id.
113. See ASHLEY JARDINA, WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS 155–215 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2019).
114. Id. at 187.
115. Id. at 173–77.
116. Id. at 179–84.
117. Id. at 188.
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continues to be extreme polarization and factions. President Biden
has made the call for unity and reducing polarization a central part
of his appeal, candidacy, and goals for his presidency.118 When one
considers the state of the nation, this is more than understandable.
What is less clear is if unity can be achieved and how we should
proceed toward this goal.
There is often an explicit assumption that the way to address
this extreme polarization is through bridging.119 Bridging is when
members of different groups reach out and engage with one
another.120 In trying to access this possibility, it is important to
understand the problem(s), the different forms bridging can take,
and under what conditions bridging is likely to be effective. This
part of the Article tackles this matter.
There have been a number of books and articles essentially
asking non-Trump supporters to understand the culture and
identity of Trump supporters in the hopes of bridging this divide.121
Some of these arguments ask us to understand the racism and
sexism of these groups. One version of this argument goes
something like this: “They have been looked over. They are not
respected. They have been looked down upon.” The issue is not that
any of these assertions are entirely wrong, but the matter is
presented both as a one-directional problem and a suggestion of not
just understanding but a call for something more.
Many of these calls for understanding are also asking us to
overlook both the harm that Trump supporters have caused and
their own agency and responsibility.122 In some versions of this
118. Domenico Montanaro, Biden Called for Unity in His Inaugural Address. He
Might Find It Hard to Come by, NPR (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.npr.org/
2021/01/20/958490425/biden-says-he-wants-to-unite-america-he-might-find-unityhard-to-come-by [https://perma.cc/5AFT-RMVS].
119. See, e.g., Grace Kim, Political Polarization in America: Solutions to Bridge
the Partisan Divide, WILLIAMS REC. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://williamsrecord.com/
447122/opinions/political-polarization-in-america-solutions-to-bridge-the-partisandivide/ [https://perma.cc/FP5T-EVUX]; Our Members - Bridging Ideological Divides,
BRIDGE ALLIANCE, https://www.bridgealliance.us/our_members_bridging_ideolog
ical_divides [https://perma.cc/URG5-U4WR].
120. See GREATER GOOD SCI. CTR., BRIDGING DIFFERENCES PLAYBOOK 9,
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/Bridging_Differences_PlaybookFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QQJ-PLCS].
121. See, e.g., BEN BRADLEE, JR., THE FORGOTTEN: HOW THE PEOPLE OF ONE
PENNSYLVANIA COUNTY ELECTED DONALD TRUMP AND CHANGED AMERICA (Little,
Brown ed., 2018); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND:
ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (The New Press 2016).
122. See generally Robert Pondiscio, The Miseducation of Donald Trump Voters,
FORDHAM INST. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/commentary/
miseducation-donald-trump-voters [https://perma.cc/YF28-DPRU] (“For those of us
in education and reform, perhaps it’s time to make white and blue collar the new
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argument, it is tantamount to demand that we accept an
identitarian argument in favor of white nationalists (including
accepting symbols of hate, which are packaged as “heritage”) and to
avoid the identity concerns expressed by marginalized groups.123
Obviously, there is a value to understanding different groups,
even those who would attack us. But there is something deeply
problematic when pundits and elites call out marginalized groups
for focusing on issues of concern to us (such as police brutality,
confederate statues, etc.) but call on us all to understand the white
nationalist mindset. There is some indication that this might be
changing after the insurrection in early January 2021, but it is
nonetheless pervasive.124 Bridging cannot be unidirectional.
A simple way of thinking about bridging is to consider how we
reach across identity boundaries to people or groups that are
considered different than us in some salient way. That difference
can hinge on race, politics, geography, ideas, interests, religion, age,
party affiliation level, and so on. It is not the difference itself but
how we individually and collectively make sense of the difference
that provides social meaning.
This point is worth lingering on. Too often, it is assumed that
attachments to those who are similar, and disquiet if not hostility
to those who are different, is natural or even an evolutionary
byproduct for humans. This is not correct. As one scholar explains,
“human beings are cognitively programmed to form conceptual
categories and use them to classify the people they counter.”125
black . . . it’s time once again to widen the definition of rights at risk to include
working class white people too.”).
123. See the discussion of the early use of the term identitarian politics. I am also
suggesting that what identities are fixated on in these scenarios is really the traits
most salient to the dominant group. The need to appease this group can have the
impact of further marginalizing some groups. For example, President Obama, in an
effort to avoid inducing anxiety for a predominantly white voter block, opted to avoid
discussing race. There are a number of studies that show that even if whites would
benefit, they will oppose a program if they think Blacks and other people of color will
also benefit. One of the attacks on the Affordable Care Act was the concern that
Blacks would benefit. See generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE
WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999)
(analyzing the public’s complex, misinformed, and racially-charged views on
welfare); ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND
EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE (2006) (comparing U.S. welfare opponents’
success in using racial and ethnic divisions to attack redistribution programs to a
more homogenous Europe, with fewer divides to exploit to demonize the poor).
124. See Ryan Fan, I Urged Sympathy for a Trump Supporter. Then January 6th
Happened, AN INJUSTICE (Jan. 6, 2022), https://aninjusticemag.com/i-urgedsympathy-for-a-trump-supporter-then-january-6th-happened-eed0009bf80
[https://perma.cc/Q3MX-R9DJ].
125. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN
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While that is true, the differences that we notice and the value and
meanings we place on these differences are largely socially
constructed, not naturally occurring.126 In other words, although
humans naturally classify people and things into categories, the
meaning ascribed to those things is not predetermined, but socially
determined.
Some differences are seen as unimportant and not an
impediment to deep human connection and understanding.127
Which differences and similarities are important is both social and
situational. This is true not just between people but also within us,
as our minds work out these meanings. In that sense our identity is
also social and situational. If our identities such as race and
nationality are socially constructed, then the difference we attach
to these socially constructed groups must also be social. There is no
natural identity. Our identities are forged in circumstance and
social context. Amartya Sen observes that when a people is attacked
or threatened based on a particular trait or condition, that trait or
condition is likely to become the most salient, enlarging the salience
of that identity.128
While most people today in the United States, and possibly
Europe, would agree that a toxic level of polarization is currently
plaguing society and the very functioning of government, there is
less agreement on both the cause and the solution.129 One of the
major disagreements over the cause of polarization in the United
States is whether our deep division is rooted in existing and growing
economic inequality, or if it is our ascriptive identities like race,
gender, religion, disability, immigration, or some combination.130
Also proposed is whether the most important division is political—
liberal versus conservative. This matter was covered in previous
parts of this Article.131
Of course, these factors may be related with each other and
interact or compound. The longstanding fight on the left is whether
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 242 (2007).
126. SCOTT E. PAGE, DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES
BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES (2008).
127. Id. at 307–08.
128. AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 3–4
(2007).
129. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, America Has Split, and It’s Now in ‘Very
Dangerous Territory’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/
26/opinion/covid-biden-trump-polarization.html [https://perma.cc/3XWA-4KT8].
130. john a. powell, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, UC BERKELEY:
BERKELEY BLOG (May 2, 2014), https://blogs.berkeley.edu/2014/05/02/inequality-inthe-twenty-first-century/ [https://perma.cc/WG4X-Y9N3].
131. See supra Section II.
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to locate the struggle against unjust social structures in an analysis
of class alone or identity (like race or gender) alone. Others ask
whether class and identity are intertwined, and, if so, to what
extent? There is reason to believe that all of these forces are at play
and are interactive or iterative. Here, however, I focus on identity.
But I am using the concept of identity closer to a social construct
and in a way that marks our structural situatedness.132
Iris Young makes the observation that much of what is called
identity or identity politics is really about how we are situated
within structures.133 Another way of thinking about identity is to
describe it in terms of what an individual feels or one’s lived
experience. This more subjective and affective way of talking about
identity offers a weak basis for analysis. It suffers from both the
problem of what Charles Tilly and others call methodological
individualism as well as essentialism.134 This approach of
methodological individualism and essentialism makes assumptions
about the unit of analysis and the nature of humans. There is a
great deal of criticism, including some of my prior writing,
challenging this frame.135
But I want to make a different point here, which is that a
subjective and affective conceptualization of identity leads us to
approach bridging devoid of analysis of power and structural
context. Yet, much of the discussion of identity and bridging
happens through the lens of essential methodological
individualism.136 Within the limitations of this framework, bridging
is too narrowly defined and applied to be an effective intervention
against polarization. So while I am largely focused on identity, the
132. See The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School,
SITUATIONIST,
https://thesituationist.wordpress.com/about-plsps-at-harvard-lawschool/ [https://perma.cc/734H-HZN8] (analyzing the concept of identity as a social
construct).
133. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 98 (2011).
134. Methodological Individualism, SCIENCEDIRECT, https://www.sciencedi
rect.com/topics/social-sciences/methodological-individualism [https://perma.cc/2QF
Y-K2ZF].
135. See generally POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE, supra note 19 (“This way of
looking at suffering has led some to assume that any effort to address it must also
be on individualistic or human terms. These assumptions are false. As previous
discussion has emphasized, much surplus suffering is caused not by individuals
directly, but by structures and institutional arrangements.”); JUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 23 (2006) (“Whereas
the question of what constitutes ‘personal identity’ within philosophical accounts
almost always centers on the question of what internal feature of the person
establishes the . . . self-identity of the person through time, the question here will be:
To what extent do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute
identity. . . ?”); Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY 390 (1993).
136. FUKUYAMA, supra note 70, at 159–60.
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category that we know of as identity can be expanded as a concept
to account for structural location and power relationships, which
allows for a broader and more robust application of the term.
Let us turn back to Putnam and Pettigrew. The intergroup
contact theorists focus on cooperation and having a common
purpose or goal as a means of prejudice reduction.137 Similarly,
Putnam focuses on individuals as members of groups in order to
figure out how to foster greater social capital.138 He has shown a
strong focus on people that are more or less equal horizontally.139 It
is not because he is unaware of power and inequality, but he is
concerned that strong power differentials or too much inequality
can distort the process.140 But the solution cannot be therefore to
ignore power. It may be that there is a background assumption that
the individual or groups are relatively equal and that issue need not
be attended to. But generally that is not the case.
While I agree with Putnam that power and inequality can
distort the effort to bridge, I think they must be faced. Consider
some examples of how power can distort bridging in terms of
empathy or cooperation from popular culture. The first is the
landmark book by Richard Wright, Native Son.141 The other is a
popular recent movie, Knives Out.142
The premise of Native Son is that a young Black man, Bigger
Thomas, is hired by a rich white family to be a chauffeur.143 The
daughter, Mary Dalton, returns from college, and Bigger is charged
with driving her and her boyfriend Jan Erlone around.144 The white
couple insists on riding in the front of the car with Bigger.145 They
insist that the social hierarchies of race and class are
meaningless.146 They fail to recognize Bigger’s profound discomfort.
At one point in the book, Mary and Jan express interest in
getting something to eat.147 Bigger asks where they would like to
go, and they answer that they would like to go to Bigger’s favorite
place to eat.148 Bigger objects, but they ignore his objection, and they
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Pettigrew, supra note 108, at 66–67.
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 103, at 137–38.
See, e.g., id. at 153.
See, e.g., id. at 151.
RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940).
KNIVES OUT (Lionsgate 2019).
WRIGHT, supra note 141, at 44.
Id.
Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
Id.
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all go to a place where Mary and Jan are not just the only white
people, but also the only wealthy people in the restaurant.149 It is
something that Bigger and the other patrons all notice. Later,
Bigger is put into an even more compromising situation as he
carries Mary into her bedroom after she has passed out from
drinking.150 I will leave it to the reader to discover what happens
afterward.
The second example I would like to draw out is from the film
Knives Out.151 Marta Cabrera is one of the protagonists. She is
Latinx and works for a rich white family as a caregiver for the
patriarch of the family. Marta lives with her undocumented mother.
In one scene, members of the Thrombey family, the wealthy white
family for whom Marta works, are discussing what should be the
appropriate policies for undocumented people living in the United
States. In the middle of the discussion, one of the family members
turns to Marta and asks her if she has an opinion on this matter.
Unlike the folks in Native Son, the family members are aware that
they are putting her into a difficult position. She cannot fully engage
in the conversation because of the power difference.
In both examples, the effort to bridge—to share an empathic
space—superficially appears to be between individuals in the scene.
But there are clearly background structures at play that implicate
both power and identity that shape their response and experience.
Much of the work on bridging today assumes that it is between
individuals that don’t understand each other and may harbor
prejudice.152 There is a further assumption that this prejudice is
actually hurt and misunderstanding.153 For these reasons, bridging
efforts are often tied to healing, a concept that is often equally bereft
of power context and suffers from methodological individualism.154
In the next section, I begin to chart our way out of these dilemmas.
VII.

Bridging and Structural Change

There is a serious problem that occurs from not being
recognized or being misrecognized.155 There has been important
work showing that the failure to be seen as a self can undermine
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 61–63.
Id. at 72.
KNIVES OUT, supra note 142.
See, e.g., Pettigrew, supra note 108.
See, e.g., BRADLEE, supra note 121.
See POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE, supra note 19.
See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
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our sense of self.156 This is also why respecting gender identity and
using preferred gender pronouns is now the norm. While
recognition can be important, I suggest it is a limited issue in the
context of polarization. One may need to be seen and recognized,
but this is not straight forward. Being recognized by certain people
is much more important than being recognized by others.157
One way of thinking about recognition is in a larger light than
what is trying to be achieved by polarization and by bridging.
Polarization can be thought of as a kind of threat. It was discussed
earlier that societal change can be seen as a threat. The perceived
threat does not have to be real. When pundits focus on the material
threat associated with the rise of authoritarian white nationalism,
they are suggesting that there is a material reality—usually read
as an economic threat, perceived or real—that leads to anxiety that
is exploited to gain support for white nationalism. Indeed, there is
data to support such a position.158
The relationship between a threat and the reaction, however,
may or may not be conscious in the group’s mind. This insight might
also suggest a solution. If you highlight people’s anxiety around the
economy or other material concerns, it will be easier to bridge and
they are less likely to see the “other” as a threat.
But this is not simply a mechanical process. There is always
the process of making meaning. Events are not self-evident but
require interpretation. So, the stories we use and have inhabited
are important in how we make meaning. Given the durable role of
racism, it is not a surprise how easily and readily racism is deployed
as a trope during economic difficulties to explain structural
problems. But the assumption that this is the full story is
problematic. We are not just economic animals. We are also
symbolic beings, and our sense of identity and being is always
unstable.
In the article Ontological Security in World Politics: State
Identity and the Security Dilemma, Jennifer Mitzen makes a
number of important claims.159 She distinguishes ontological threat
156. Id. at 25; RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
157. See, e.g., Jan E. Stets, Identity Theory, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 100 (Peter J. Burke ed., 2d ed. 2018) (arguing that
positive evaluations of self from one’s in-group may serve to offset negative
evaluations from others).
158. See Thomas B. Edsall, Status Anxiety Is Blowing Wind Into Trump’s Sails,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/09/opinion/trumpstatus-anxiety.html [https://perma.cc/7Y4W-QC3B].
159. See Jennifer Mitzen, Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity
and the Security Dilemma, 12 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 341 (2006).
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from security or material threats and argues that many conflicts
are based on the ontological threat.160 She asserts that this threat
can be at a national or group level and not just at the individual
level.161 Similarly, Pettigrew and other intergroup contact theorists
draw our attention to the role of context in reducing prejudice and,
by extension, polarization.162 The context is decisive in determining
whether an intervention will work or not. By implication, this
research suggests that the best way to change the individual heart
and mind is by focusing on structure and culture.163
Consider the racial ontological threat that white nationalists
express. The statement that “Jews will not replace us” or the claim
that miscegenation is white genocide are expressions of a group
ontological threat. This brings us to another point: the threat is not
only to the individual, but also to the group. It may or may not be
based on personal prejudice or bias.
Consider Dylann Roof as he walked into a Black church and
killed nine parishioners.164 What is particularly disturbing about
this tragedy, although not as widely reported, is that prior to his
attack he was in the church having fellowship with the Black
members for over an hour.165 He stated they were kind to him and
he liked them.166 He expressed regret for having to kill them, but
from his perspective, what he was doing was an act to save the white
race.167 Individual outreach bridging would have failed to dissuade
Roof from his murderous intent. Another approach is called for.
However, within both our contemporary American democracy
as well as the broader international environment, there are an
assortment of situations, events, and catastrophes that could have
been ameliorated through a bridging approach. For example,
despite currently existing religious divisions, Pope Francis, in an
unprecedented move, elected to travel to the residence of Iraq’s most

160. Id. at 342.
161. Id.
162. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 98, at 766.
163. See id. at 767. I am aware that this claim may be jarring to most Americans,
still it is important to consider.
164. Karen Workman & Andrea Kannapell, The Charleston Shooting: What
Happened, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/thecharleston-shooting-what-happened.html [https://perma.cc/6W69-AASV].
165. Erik Ortiz & Daniel Arkin, Dylann Roof ‘Almost Didn’t Go Through’ with
Charleston Church Shooting, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/charleston-church-shooting/dylann-roof-almost-didnt-go-through-charlest
on-church-shooting-n378341 [https://perma.cc/P93B-5DVD].
166. Id.
167. See Workman & Kannapell, supra note 164.
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reclusive, and powerful, Shiite religious cleric.168 He did this to
ultimately bridge across religious lines to advocate for peace and
actively combat persecution of those of certain faiths in the
region.169 It was a mutual acknowledgement of human dignity that
encouraged peace building. This example highlights the possibility
of bridging while reducing preconditions. It can be contended that
much of the violence that becomes larger components of serious
externalities of religious conflict was avoided by choosing to bridge
rather than break.
Domestically, we can also observe examples of bridging being
utilized to avoid tragedies. Daryl Davis, an active blues musician,
often elected to sit and have conversations with active KKK
members.170 Despite being a Black man, Davis always entered into
these conversations with no intention to change the minds of Klan
members.171 Often after sharing meals and small discussions, these
previous affiliates abandoned the Klan themselves.172 Bridging does
not necessitate complete agreement, nor can one enter into a
bridging relationship with another diametrically opposed expecting
to change them. As such, this example serves as one of many ways
to approach bridging across convoluted racial politics.
If we want to address the extreme problem today, at what level
should the focus be and what is the aim? As stated earlier, most of
the work focuses at the individual or interpersonal level.173 The
problem is that much of the polarization that we are most concerned
with is not at the individual level but the group and/or institutional
level. This is sometimes discussed in broader literature as the
micro, meso, and macro.174
According to the same theorist on bridging, the micro has the
least amount of agency and the least amount of power.175 In
addition, even if you could do something at the micro, it is not likely
to scale up. This is in part a problem of aggregation. Mouzelis is
168. Nicole Winfield & Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Pope, Top Iraq Shiite Cleric Deliver
Message of Coexistence, A.P. NEWS (Mar. 6, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/middleeast-islamic-state-group-ali-al-sistani-pope-francis-iraq-f95098b179f6a82157e87a7c
b6cc0c3d [https://perma.cc/P9GW-ZRH7].
169. Id.
170. Nicholas Kristof, ‘How Can You Hate Me When You Don’t Even Know Me?’,
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/26/opinion/racismpolitics-daryl-davis.html [https://perma.cc/2YUQ-FXF9].
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra Section V.
174. See Derik Gelderblom, The Limits to Bridging Social Capital: Power, Social
Context and the Theory of Robert Putnam, 66 SOC. REV. 1309, 1315–16 (2018).
175. Id. at 1315.
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particularly critical of Putnam for falling prey to the problem of
aggregation in his approach to bridging and focusing on small
groups and individuals:176 “[a]uthors such as Putnam (2000) and
Uslaner (2009) who apply the social capital concept to societies
rather than small groups, tend to think that the nature of social
relations in general or in small groups can be extrapolated to society
as a whole.”177 This reflects what Mouzelis describes as a logic of
aggregation:
[I]ndividual social capital situations cannot be aggregated
because they are interdependent, and not independent. They
are interdependent firstly due to powerful actors subsuming
them. They are, in addition, interdependent because of the
nature of their interconnections on the horizontal level. Of
course, theorists such as Putnam do not study small groups as
such.178

One would also need to engage at the meso- and macro-scales.
At these levels, one finds the influence to potentially have the reach
that includes institutions and policies. Aiming at the meso- and
macro-level may be necessary to create the space or shape the
institutions in which bridging may become possible. Leadership is
critical at these scales. Trump and Biden operate at the macro scale,
shaping broad narratives, while university presidents and
corporate leaders operate at the meso-scale, exercising considerable
power and resources within their respective institutions or
markets.179
Going back to Pettigrew and others, it is clear that bridging
works best under certain conditions.180 It helps to know what
problem one is trying to solve and what would count as a solution.
Achieving better inter-group understanding and having a sense of
shared humanity could be a goal within itself. Or it could be
governing and passing certain policies. When it is not possible to
create shared goals, or where goals are incompatible, it may not be
possible to bridge. Consider if my sense of safety requires your
subordination and possibly even death or incarceration, then
preconditions for bridging may prove elusive. This is why white
supremacy is such a challenge to de-polarization. It is not a stretch
to assert that white supremacy requires non-white subordination;
in fact, it is definitional to white supremacy.
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See, e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 98, at 766–67.
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As one attempts the effort to bridge, it is important to be clear
on the preconditions. If there is too great of a power differential,
bridging may not be possible, and one should look at what might
come out of such a process with a critical eye. Bridging between
individuals may be an important task, but it is not our only task.
We must also look at the meso- and macro-level. To do this, we may
need to either create new conditions or spaces in which bridging can
occur, but should not shy from it simply because it is difficult. We
have little alternative.
VIII.

Conclusion

In spite of all of the problems associated with polarization, it
is clear that some polarization is not only desirable but probably
inevitable. The focus of this Article is the extreme and toxic
polarization that is growing and threatening us and our
institutions. This polarization is deeply spread across the United
States and much of the world, and it is reflected in terms of race,
immigration, religion, and class.181 While all of these may contain a
material impact, they are also related to recognition, dignity, and
belonging.
Bridging and similar expressions such as calls for unity are
now an animating force in addressing our toxic and harmful forms
of polarization. Many people and groups come to bridging without
any attention to power. While this might need to be a strong
precondition, in part because the precondition is often met, one
might not notice its central need. Still others like Mary and Jan in
Native Son will assume that we are all individuals and our power
does not matter if our heart is in the right place.182 This Article
suggests the limit of this approach.
Community organizers will likely find obvious the call to pay
attention to power as a precondition. Much of organizing starts with
the primary goal of building power for marginal communities. But
this desire can also lead to an unhelpful position. While power
imbalance can distort the effort to bridge, the loading up of
preconditions can be used as a reason not to bridge. The
precondition is not a call for complete equality. Many bridging
conversations are likely to take place where the power differential
is not so great that the conversation must be delayed.
While this Article calls for a more complex way of looking at
bridging and polarization, it is not a broad rejection of bridging.
181. See powell, Bridging or Breaking?, supra note 20.
182. See Wright, supra note 141.
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Bridging is a process that requires both a set of conditions, such as
relative equality and agency, as well as a container with
background or foreground goals participants can share. Where
these conditions are lacking, there must be an effort to find or create
them. Leadership, narrative, and structural sensitivity are the
keys.

